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not a described tract of land, but a "life estate in and to the following
described tract of land." °
Oxendine points to the possible necessity that the court in the future
may have to define the "granting clause" with some exactness. At the
present various interpretative problems might arise in application of the
Artis-Oxendine rule, such as: where the granting clause begins and
ends, and therefore, whether or not particular words are included;
whether a draftsman using a form deed can add to the printed granting
clause, and if so, what is the result of conflicting words within the
granting clause. Thus it is questionable whether the presumably
desired result of certainty has yet been achieved.
H. MoRRIsoN JOHNSTON, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Non Taxable Gift Versus
Taxable Compensation.
Frequently the taxpayer must decide whether a particular payment
is the receipt of income in the form of compensation- or a non-taxable
gift.2 The decision is problematical, for the legal distinctions between
them are nowhere clearly expressed. If the taxpayer cautiously classi-
fies the receipts as compensation, he might increase his tax burden need-
les!ly. Alternatively, his election to exclude such receipts from gross
income faces possible challenge by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States decided three
cases involving the "gift versus .compensation" issue.3 The case of
Comnissioner v. Duberstein4 grew out of a fairly common business
situation. The taxpayer, president of a corporation and a business
friend of one Berman, president of another corporation, supplied at
Berman's request the names of potential customers for Berman's com-
" In Oxendine the court clearly did not consider the inserted material part
of the granting clause, but there was a dissent as to this. Also, in Ocendine
the majority merely laid down a rule of exclusion, which leaves much to be
desired as to definiteness.
1 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 61(a): "Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, in-
cluding (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services,
including fees, commissions, and similar items. . ."
2 INT. Rxv. CODE oF 1954, § 102(a): "Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift; bequest, devise, or inheritance."
"'The Government, urging that clarification of the problem typified by these
two cases was necessary, and that the approaches taken by the Courts of Appeal.
for the Second and the Sixth Circuits were in conflict, petitioned for cer-
tiorari. . . . On this basis, and because of the importance of the question in the
administration of the income tax laws, we granted certiorari ... " Commis-,
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1960).
'363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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pany. Berman offered to give the taxpayer a Cadillac car, but the
taxpayer did not need or desire a car, nor had he expected compensation.
Nevertheless, he reluctantly agreed to accept the car. He did not include
the value of the car in his gross income. The Commissioner assessed
a deficiency and the Tax Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed.5
The case of Stanton v. United States" concerned the payment of a
"gratuity" to an employee by his employer at the time of his resigna-
tion. The taxpayer had been employed approximately ten years as
comptroller of a corporation and as president of its wholly owned
subsidiary, receiving an annual salary of $22,500. The directors voted
a gratuity of $20,000 in appreciation of his services, provided he re-
linquish all rights and claims to any benefits from the corporation's re-
tirement and pension funds other than a return of his contributions to
the fund. He was not required to furnish any services after his resigna-
tion. In a refund suit, the district court sitting without a jury found
that the payments were a gift. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed.7
The case of United States v. Kaisers presented the question of
whether payments by a labor union constitute a gift or taxable income
to a striking non-member. The taxpayer was employed by the Kohler
Company when the UAW called a strike at the company's plant in 1954.
He was not a member of the union but he did support the strike. Having
no other means of support and not being entitled to receive welfare aid,
the taxpayer requested assistance from the union. In keeping with its
policy of aiding both members and non-members in need, the union
supplied food vouchers worth six dollars a week and nine dollars cash
per week for rent. He was not required to picket but did so anyway.
In a refund suit, a jury found that the union's assistance constituted a
gift, but judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered for the
government on the ground that the assistance was income as a matter
of law. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and
reinstated the jury verdict 9
Decisions in these three cases were handed down by the Supreme
Court on the same day, and in each case the decision was based upon a
'Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959). The court
reasoned that the taxpayer had met his burden of proof that the payment was
intended as a gift and not taxable compensation.
8363 U.S. 278 (1960).
'Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959). The court reasoned
that the taxpayer had not met the burden of proving that the commissioner was
wrong in his determinatoin that the payment was taxable compensation.
8363 U.S. 299 (1960).
" Kaiser v. United States, 262 F2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958). The court reasoned
that the payments were consistent with charity and thus constituted a gift and
not taxable compensation.
1961]
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concept of limited appellate review. The Court completely avoided a
decision on the merits of the cases which would have helped to clarify
the gift versus compensation issue. The Court pointed out that the
trier of fact, being closer to the situation, could more properly decide.
the issue, and, where the trial is by a judge sitting without a jury,
reversal should follow if, but only if, the decision is "clearly erroneous."
But where there is a jury trial under proper instruction, the only de-
termination to be made on appeal concerning this issue is whether the
verdict can be supported on the evidence. This limitation would not,
however, obviate appellate review upon other grounds.
In the Duberstein case the Court held that the Tax Court's finding
for the Commissioner was not "clearly erroneous" and reversed the
court of appeals. In the Stanton case the Court found that the district
court's finding of a gift was so "sparse and conclusory" that it afforded
no revelation of that court's concept of the determining facts and legal
standard. judgment of the court of appeals was vacated and the case
remanded to the district court.10
In the Kaiser case it was found that the jury had been properly in-
structed and that there was evidence to support its decision for the tax-
payer. The court of appeals' judgment was affirmed.
The Government had requested the Court to promulgate a new test
to serve as a uniform standard for determination of what constitutes a
gift, namely that gifts should be defined as transfers of property made
for personal as distinguished from business reasons.1' The Court un-
equivocally rejected this test, feeling that the varying fact situations of
such cases render it impossible to apply a uniform standard and that
the trier of fact, being closer to the situation, can apply its "experience
with the mainspring of human conduct" to all the factors and determine
when a transfer amounts to a gift. The Court also said that if a test
was desirable, Congress was the proper body to establish one by an
amendment to the code, as was done in the case of prizes and awards.
12
The Court then left the issue of gift versus compensation to be decided
on a case-by-case basis.
In previous decisions dealing with gifts the Supreme Court has laid
down some broad rules of thumb, and a review of them will indicate
something of the rationale used by the Court in deciding cases involving
this issue.
"0 Stanton v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). Upon re-
trial the district court judge found that the payment was a gift stating that the
evidence showed that it was the employer's intention to make a gift.
11 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 n.6 (1960).12 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 74. This section, new in the 1954 code, removed
prizes and awards from the gift versus compensation question and established
separate tests for determination of the tax consequence upon receipt of a prize or
award.
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(1) Since the Internal Revenue Code definitely distinguishes be-
tween compensation on the one hand and gifts on the other, these terms
are and were meant to be mutually exclusive. A transfer cannot be both
a gift and a payment of compensation.' 3
(2) "Gifts" is a generic word of broad connotation which derives
its meaning from the particular statute. In the Internal Revenue Code,
it denotes the gratuitous receipt of financial advantages.'
4
(3) The payment for services, even though voluntary, is nevertheless
compensation within the tax statute. The form of the payment is im-
material as is the fact that it may not be paid directly to the taxpayer.15
(4) If the payments to the employees of a business enterprise are
made by persons interested in its success or the maintenance of the
employee's good will and loyalty, there is an inference that the payments
are intended as compensation."O
(5) The lack of any constraining force of a moral or legal duty or
the lack of the incentive of any anticipated benefit other than the satis-
faction which flows from the performance of a generous act is important
but not determinative.17 N
(6) A gift is nonetheless a gift because inspired by gratitude for
past faithful service of the recipient where it amounts to nothing more
than the acknowledgment of an historical fact as a reason for making
the gift.'
(7) The discharge of a legal obligation to make the payments for
services rendered is in no sense a gift and it is irrelevant that the payor
derives no economic benefit from these transfers.' 9
" Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 39 (1937) (dictum). The payments
were made by a corporation to employees of a predecessor corporation who were
not retained in the employment of the new corporation. The payments were held
to be gifts to the employees.
" Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943) (dictum).
Partial forgiveness of back rent and cancellation of accrued interest on notes did
not create taxable income to the debtor taxpayer when the forgiveness was found
to be gratuitous. But see Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
" Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279, U.S. 716, 730 (1929) (dictum).
Voluntary payment by the employer of the income taxes assessable against the
employee constituted additional taxable income to such employee. For payments
of property other than money see Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956),
involving stock options and Neville v. Brodrick, 235 F,2d 263 (10th Cir. 1956),
involving transfers of stock.
" Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.. 34, 41 (1937) (dictum).
27 Ibid.18 Id. at 44.
1" Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952) (dictum). "In the legal
sense payment of a prize to a winner of a contest is the discharge of a contractual
obligation. The acceptance by the. contestants of the offer ... . creates an en-
forceable contract. The discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services
rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift." Id. at
713.
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(8) Payments to an employee by an employer to secure better
services are plainly compensation.20
(9) "A gift in the statutory sense... proceeds from a 'detached and
disinterested generosity' . .. 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity
or like impulses' . . . And in this regard, the most critical considera-
tion ... is the transferor's 'intention' .... 'What controls is the in-
tention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made.' "21
Applying these rules of thumb to the facts in the Duberstein, Stanton
and Kaiser cases, there does not appear to be any way to question the
conclusions of the respectvie triers of fact. That is not to say, however,
that the conclusion would find universal acceptance, for these cases are
close to the line and could have been decided either way. The Court
seems to imply that it would have affirmed the decisions of the trier of
fact even if these cases had been decided conversely in the first instance.
While decisions of the lower courts and the Tax Court in this area
have been limited to the particular facts in each individual case, it is
possible to indicate what elements of several basic situations have been
more or less determinative in these decisions. 22  The cases from these
courts fall into these categories: formal employer-employee relationships;
reorganizations and sales of business; payments upon retirement; death
benefits to the employee's family or estate; and informal business rela-
tionships.
In a formal employer-employee relationship, the payments are usually
made pursuant to the employment contract. Such payments are com-
pensation for services rendered even though no service is ever per-
formed.23  Additional payments above the employee's basic salary or
wage are regarded as compensation as long as they bear a fixed relation-
ship to the employee's length of service and present salary. 24  It does
not matter what designation the employer has given these additional
payments25 or that the employer does not take a deduction for tax pur-
poses.26 The relationship is an indication that the payments were meant
" Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956) (dictum). Here there
was a stock option plan with an arrangement whereby an employer transferred
valuable consideration to his employee for services. The employee taxpayer
realized taxable gain upon exercising the option. Special treatment is given to
employee stock option under section 421 of the 1954 code where, if the plan
qualifies, the tax consequences will be different from that in the Lo Bue case.
"1 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (dictum).
"This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of all cases in this area.
" George B. Lester, 19 B.T.A. 549 (1930). Contra, Estate of David R. Daly,
3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926).
"Painter v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Tex. 1953); N. H. Van
Sicklen, Jr., 33 B.T.A. 544 (1935).
"Wallace v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Thomas v. Commis-
sioner, 135 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1943). Contra, Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th
Cir. 1929).
"'Thomas v. Commissioner, supra note 25.
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as compensation; and where it is absent, the court has held the payment
to be a gift.27 The one exception appears to be in the case of articles of
small value given on special occasions where there arises a justifiable
inference of gift. Thus the treasury has recently ruled that things of
nominal value given by an employer to his employees at Christmas can
be gifts even though they are used to promote good will and are de-
ducted as business expenses.28 But a wedding gift, in recognition of
service, has been held to be compensation. 29 It would seem that
wherever payments are made by an employer to his employee it is ex-
tremely doubtful that they can be treated as gifts, for it will be difficult,
if not impossible, to rebut the presumption that the payments are in-
tended as compensation for services, either past or future. An employer
is in business for profit, not philanthropy, the courts seem to say.
Key employees often receive additional payments when a business is
sold or undergoes reorganization. These payments are considered com-
pensation where they bear a relationship to the length of service and
previous salary scale80 or where the transferor deducted them for tax
purposes.3 ' The theory is that the payments were intended as additional
compensation for past services, and a deduction by the employer is
treated as strong evidence of this intention. This inference has even
attached to payments made to an employee when he resigned volun-
tarily.3 2 Such an inference may be overcome only in very special cir-
cumstances. Where the payments were voted by the stockholders of
the successor corporation, they have been treated as gifts on the theory
that moral and legal obligation is lacking; and it did not matter that the
stockholders of the successor corporation were essentially the same as
those of the old corporation.33
Extra payments to employees at the time of their retirement, in
recognition of their long and faithful service, have been held to be
compensation for past services, especially where the employer takes a
deduction in his return 4 The reason for the employee's retirement
does not matter.35 There is, however, an exception in favor of clergy-
men who receive such payments in excess of contract provisions upon
retirement, these being considered tokens of gratitude and appreciation
" Hoefle v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1940).
"
8 Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 17.
'" Nickelsburg v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1946).1o Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246. (2d Cir. 1952) ; Poorman v. Com-
missioner, 131 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1942).
" Chauncey L. Landon, 16 B.T.A. 907 (1929).
" See Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926). Contra, Cunningham v.
Commissioner, 67 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1933).
" Hall v. Commissioner, 93 F2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1938).
" Willkie v. Commissioner, 127 F2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Fisher v. Commis-
sioner, 59 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932).
" Ruth Jackson, 25 T.C. 1106 (1956) ; L. Gordon Walker, 25 T.C. 832 (1956).
19611
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and consequently gifts.3 6 Under similar circumstances, the retirement
benefits of an officer of a non-profit organization have been treated as a
gift.37 In summary it seems that an employee of a profit making organi-
zation as opposed to a non-profit or tax-exempt one will have difficulty
sucessfully claiming that additional payments received due to reorganiza-
tion, sale or retirement were gifts. The profit motive of business does
not allow for much charity, and the inference that these were payments
for past services as well as the evidence of the employer's deduction will
be difficult to overcome. A non-profit organization, the courts imply,
is more likely to have motives of charity.
Death benefits paid by an employer to the employee's family are
compensation when paid pursuant to the employment contract 8  or where
the payments are made as a general practice so as to become a moral
obligation. 9 But if the benefits are entirely voluntary and the bene-
ficiary has rendered no service, they can be considered gifts regardless
of whether the employer has taken a deduction for the payments in his
return.40 Payments to the employee's estate are treated in the same
way as payments to the family.4 1 For 1954 and later years, section
101 (b) of the 1954 Code will affect the taxation of these benefits. Un-
der this section, up to $5,000 may be paid to the beneficiaries of a de-
ceased employee free of income tax. Nothing in the way of a contract
or plan is required to achieve this tax free status. But if the payments
are gifts, they are not subject to the provisions of this section and are
entirely excluded from taxation.
42
The discussion of the lower court decisions up to this point has
dealt with the formal employer-employee situation. There are also prob-
lems where this relationship does not exist. In this area the principle
factor in determining the question of gift or compensation is whether
the payments were made in a business context. Token payments re-
ceived for friendly services, such as non-professional investment ad-
vice,43 endorsement of a note,44 and voluntary legal services" have been
held to be gifts. But where the payment was given to the taxpayer as
"Abernethy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Mutch v. Com-
missioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th
Cir. 1949).
"'Adams v. Riordan, 57-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 1 9770 (D. Vt. 1957).
Flarsheim v. United States, 156 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946).
Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958).
"0 United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960) ; United States v.
Allinger, 275 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1960); Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876
(4th Cir. 1958). Contra, Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. No. 10 (1960).
" Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); Estate of
Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957).
,' United States v. Reed, 277 F2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
"8 Estate of Grace G. McAdow, 12 T.C. 311 (1949).
" Dupuy G. Warrick, 44 B.T.A. 1068 (1941).
"'J. Marion Wright, 30 T.C. 392 (1958).
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consideration for aid in furthering the business for the transferor and
the payment bears a relationship to the value of the service rendered, it
has been held to be compensation for services. 48 Also where the pay-
ment was to a taxpayer for services in arranging a business transaction
between other individuals, and the transferor is one of these individuals,
the payment is held to be compensation for services.47 Tips48 and re-
wards for special services 49 are payment for services. Legal fees shared
by lawyers for handling a case are held to be compensation.50 As might
be expected, an allowance to a wife by her husband for acting as a house-
wife was not income for tax purposes.51 In short, if there is a business
connotation in the service and the payment bears a relationship to the
value of the service, the payment is very likely to be classified as com-
pensation.
In conclusion it can only be reiterated that there are no clearly
defined meanings for the terms "gifts" and "compensation" as used in
the Internal Revenue Code nor is it probable that they will ever be
clearly defined.52 The Supreme Court in the principal cases did not
attempt to resolve the definitional problems. As a result, there is no
clear cut course for the taxpayer to follow, no precise rule for the tax
lawyer to apply. If, a transfer of money or other property is contem-
plated, and a gift is intended, there are several precautiohs the observance
of which might insure the completion of a gift and not the creation of
taxable compensation within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
(1) The term "gift" should be used and such terms as "bonus.," "salary,"
and "honorarium" should be avoided in any formal letters or resolutions
concerning the payment. . (2) References to any services which the
donee might have rendered should be avoided. (3) If the transferor
is a corporation, the transfer should be ratified by the stockholders.
(4) The use of a salary schedule and length of service should be avoided
when deciding upon the amount of payment. (5) The use of any refer-
ence to possible future payment or to a general practice of making such
payments should be avoided. (6) A deduction for tax purposes for
these payments should not be taken.
FraNcis N. MILLETT, JR.
Alford J. Williams, Jr., 29 B.T.A. 892 (1934).47 Lundsford v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1933).
' Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F,2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949).
"O.D. 602, 3 Cum. BUXLL. 93 (1920). Reward for the prevention of a bank
robbery was held to be compensation.
" Mertz v. Hickey, 162 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Friedman v. Commissioner,
130 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1942).
" Rosa E. Burkhart, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928).
" Such lack of clear definition is -also evident in other areas of income tax, for
example, the problem of "interest versus dividends." See John Kelly Co. v. Com-
missioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
